

# The Information Content of Stress Test Announcements

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## Abstract

We exploit institutional features of the U.S. banking stress tests to disentangle different types of information garnered by market participants when the stress test results are released. By examining the reaction of different asset prices, we find evidence that market participants value the stress test announcements not only for the information on possible future capital distributions but also for the signals about bank resilience. These results back the use of stress tests by central banks to inform the broader public about the soundness of the banking system.

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# 1 Introduction

In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, it has become standard practice around the world to rely on stress tests to gauge the soundness of banks. In the United States, the annual release of the stress test results is subject to intense public scrutiny accompanied by voluminous media coverage.<sup>1</sup> Not surprisingly, financial market participants have also shown a keen interest in the results of the stress tests. Flannery, Hirtle and Kovner (2017) and Fernandes, Igan and Pinheiro (2020) show that stress test disclosures are associated with significantly higher returns and trading volume for the stress-tested banks. While it is already known that financial markets react to stress test announcements, it is not clear whether this reaction is driven by the immediate impact on capital distribution plans to investors, whose approval by the Federal Reserve is linked to the stress test results, or whether it is driven by the stress test results conveying news about the ability of the largest banks to withstand harsh economic conditions. The former hypothesis implies that only a restricted set of financial actors benefits from the stress tests, while the latter implies that the stress test results convey information on the soundness of the banking system of importance for the broader public. A corollary of this latter hypothesis is that the stress test scenarios are severe but plausible and the related stress test results are credible.

We find evidence that market participants value the stress test announcements not only for the information on possible future capital distributions but also for the signals about bank resilience. A focus on the U.S. stress tests allows us to gauge the reaction to different types of information as, until 2019, the annual results used to be announced in two phases. For the first phase, which carried no supervisory consequences, we find that when results pointed to a more sizable capital cushion, CDS spreads declined and stock prices rose systematically. This configuration of reactions of stock returns and CDS spreads point to financial market participants acting on information about the underlying probability of default of each firm, as opposed to only reacting to changes in expected payouts. In connection with a second phase of the stress tests that had supervisory consequences, we also find evidence that when regulators prevented dividends or share buybacks from expanding, stock prices declined, but we do not detect a systematic response of CDS spreads. For this second phase, the consequences for payouts dominate. Nonetheless, taken together, the results for the two phases point to stress tests being informative about the resilience of each firm even abstracting from supervisory consequences.

Our analysis is based on an array of event studies. A typical requirement of these studies is to isolate the surprise component for the event by controlling for market participants' expectations.

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<sup>1</sup>Supervisory objections to the capital plans submitted as part of the stress tests have also been associated with staff changes at the very top of the largest U.S. bank holding companies. Perhaps most prominently, the objections to the capital plans of Citigroup are often cited in press coverage as explanation for the resignation of the CEO in 2012. See for instance, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443854204578060280201488530>

We exploit the peculiar structure of the U.S. stress tests that used to differentiate them from the stress tests conducted in other countries. Through 2019, results for two distinct phases of the stress tests were announced one week apart, with the results of the Dodd Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST) coming before the results for the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). The results were based on the same supervisory scenarios but differed by their assumption regarding capital plans for dividends and share buybacks and by the supervisory consequences. The DFAST results used a dummy capital plan based on the distributions for the previous stress test cycle, while the CCAR results incorporated the new capital plans. Furthermore, the DFAST results bore no direct supervisory consequences for the firms, while the Federal Reserve could curb capital distributions based on the subsequent CCAR results. This particular structure allows us to take the results for DFAST and CCAR within the same cycle to size the surprise change in capital plans, whereas we can take the difference in results for DFAST and CCAR across cycles to size the surprise change in the capital cushion. Furthermore, the fact that new capital plans are only approved when the CCAR results are released helps us isolate information about bank resilience at the DFAST phase.<sup>2</sup>

We first show that, following the release of the DFAST results, increases in loss absorption capacity, as implied by a higher minimum value of tier 1 capital relative to the minimum in the previous stress test cycle lead to declines in CDS spreads and increases in stock prices. Although a higher tier 1 capital minimum under DFAST does not guarantee that bank will be able to expand its payouts, we cannot exclude that market participants take such a signal from the results. However, the associated tightening of CDS spreads clearly points to market participants interpreting the DFAST results as indicative of greater resilience, and may explain part of the stock price reaction through the risk-premium channel. Turning to the CCAR results, the reaction of stock prices was systematically related to actions undertaken by the Federal Reserve that curbed capital distributions. We show that when capital plans were objected to or not approved, stock prices declined. This result seems exclusively driven by the limitations on capital distributions, as we do not find evidence of a significant response of CDS spreads.

In sum, we find clear evidence that financial markets scrutinize the stress test results to understand whether participating firms can withstand harsh economic conditions. If we had found that only stock prices reacted systematically, it would have pointed to benefits from the stress tests accruing to a limited number of individual. By contrast, our finding that CDS spreads respond with an opposite sign relative to the response of stock returns highlights the importance of information from the stress tests for the broader public.

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<sup>2</sup>See Lehnert and Hirtle (2015) for a detailed description of the institutional details for the stress tests.

## 2 Literature Review

The academic literature on macroeconomic stress testing is expanding rapidly building on early contributions to research on stress tests that drew heavily on the experience of practitioners. Henry et al. (2018) provide a comprehensive review. Blaschke et al. (2001) and Kohn and Liang (2019) provide a general overview of the implementation, benefits, and consequences of stress testing banks.

Perhaps, Flannery, Hirtle and Kovner (2017) and Fernandes, Igan and Pinheiro (2020) are the closest papers to ours. Their focus is on the overall banking sector and they find that markets do react to stress test announcements. Building on their results, we use firm-specific data to investigate whether the market reaction to the stress test announcements is linked to the ability of banks to withstand harsh economic conditions or is connected to the expected cash flow. Our paper is also related to Philippon, Pessarossi and Camara (2017) and to Georgescu et al. (2017), whose focus is on the stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority. Philippon, Pessarossi and Camara (2017) use the scenarios for macroeconomic factors—GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment—to estimate the sensitivity of individual banks to macroeconomic shocks. They find these estimated sensitivities predict relatively well the realized losses of banks in subsequent years, backing the value of the stress test results. Georgescu et al. (2017) also focus on stock returns and CDS spreads finding a systematic relationship with the stress test results. In addition, they look at CDS spreads on sovereign debt for the headquarter countries of banks in the stress tests, finding a systematic impact there, too. We focus on the U.S. stress test announcements that to discriminate between the risk premium versus the cash flow information content of those announcements. A separate strand of the literature has focused on the value and desirability of disclosing supervisory information. For instance, Goldstein and Sapra (2014), Alvarez and Barlevy (2014), and Goldstein and Leitner (2015) theoretically show that disclosing supervisory information may be welfare improving and may promote financial stability. Our empirical results contribute to this literature showing that the information content of stress test announcement can indeed affect market participants' perception of the riskiness of banks.

Finally, our work is also related to the vast literature that explores the reaction of asset prices to macroeconomic announcements or to corporate announcements, such as dividends. On the macroeconomic side, early papers, such as Fama (1981), focused on the connection between stock returns and inflation measures or monetary aggregates. Apart from news for inflation, Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) shows a systematic reaction of stock returns to the balance of trade, employment, and housing starts. Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005) investigate the information content of news about unemployment. On the corporate side, Brav and Heaton (2015) provide a helpful review of evidence from event studies.<sup>3</sup> Unlike ours, most event studies are either focused

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<sup>3</sup>See in particular Appendix 4 Brav and Heaton (2015).

on broad measures of stock returns or exclude financial firms. Unlike ours, most event studies are either focused on broad measures of stock returns or exclude financial firms. An exception is Kelly, Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2016), which is squarely focused on banks.

### 3 Sizing Surprises and Market Reactions

For our analysis, we exploit the peculiar structure for the announcements of the U.S. stress tests. Through 2019, the U.S. stress tests consisted of two separate tests with results published about a week apart. The first results to be released were for DFAST, followed by those for CCAR. Both tests evaluated capital adequacy assuming exactly the same supervisory macroeconomic scenario. However, while the DFAST analysis was conducted assuming a dummy capital distribution plan, based on the previous year’s distributions, the capital calculations for the CCAR results were based on the proposed capital distributions for the current stress test cycle. We rely on the difference between the CCAR and the DFAST results to isolate the unexpected component of the stress test announcements. A further important difference between CCAR and DFAST is that they entail different supervisory consequences: while the Federal Reserve did not take supervisory actions following the DFAST results, it could object to the capital distribution plans and put limits on payouts following the CCAR results.<sup>4</sup>

Our analysis, based on an array of event studies, faces two challenges. First, we need to select a summary measure of the stress test results; and second, we need to control for market participants’ expectations of this summary measure in order to isolate the surprise component. Given that the principal aim of the stress tests is to assess the capital adequacy and capital planning practices of the participating firms, we focus on capital. In particular, our summary measure for each participating firm is the minimum value of the tier 1 capital ratio over the nine-quarter assessment period used by the U.S. stress tests.<sup>5</sup>

In order to identify the surprise component of these measures, we adapt our approach depending on whether we are analyzing the CCAR or the DFAST announcements. For the former, our surprise component is the difference between the minimum value for the tier 1 capital ratio attained under the current year’s DFAST minus the one attained under the current year’s CCAR. While the capital path under DFAST assumes a dummy plan based on last year’s capital distributions, CCAR results are based on capital plans for the current year. Accordingly, when this difference is positive, it

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<sup>4</sup>In some years the Federal Reserve issued objections to the capital plans, in others it issued “non-approvals.” Both carried the requirement to submit revised capital plans and curb payouts to shareholders prior to the approval of the new plans.

<sup>5</sup>The Federal Reserve publishes stress test scenarios that cover 13 quarters. However, the last four quarters are used to compute provisions. Accordingly, the stress test results report the minimum tier 1 capital ratio over a nine-quarter assessment period.

points to an expansion in approved capital distributions relative to last year's. Given the relatively short time lapse between the release of the DFAST and the CCAR results, this measure is a good proxy of the surprise component of the CCAR results.

To identify the surprise component of the DFAST results, we take the difference between the minimum value for the tier 1 capital ratio in the current year's DFAST and the minimum value for tier 1 capital ratio in the previous year's CCAR.<sup>6</sup> Given that this year DFAST results are based on the assumption that the BHC will implement the same capital distributions approved by the Federal Reserve in the previous year CCAR, a higher minimum capital requirement may point to greater resilience and signal that the BHC can proceed with a larger capital distribution compared to last year, if allowed by the following week's CCAR results.

### 3.1 Abnormal Overnight Trading Volumes and Returns

For the event studies, we focus on the banks headquartered in the United States.<sup>7</sup> Figure 1 shows the absolute value of overnight returns around the CCAR announcements. The data are from CRSP. The figure expresses these returns as percentiles of the distribution of overnight returns for each bank for the six months preceding each release. Overnight returns following CCAR announcement are mainly abnormal, coming from the tail of the distribution for the year preceding the announcements.

As we only report the overnight returns for the banks included in our study, Figure 1 also gives a complete account of the firms in our dataset. Notice that Ally Financial and Citizens Financial Group became public companies after the release of the 2014 results, which explains missing values in the figure for those two banks for the 2013 and 2014 cycles. Missing values for other banks in certain cycles indicate that the Federal Reserve did not test those banks in those particular cycles.

We next explore whether abnormal returns could be connected with markets seizing up, but find little evidence of malfunctions. Figure 2 reports analogous statistics to those in Figure 1 for trading volumes. The data source is again CRSP. The figure shows that the days following CCAR releases are also characterized by abnormally elevated trading volumes, mainly in the upper tails of the distributions, which we interpret as indicating that markets were functioning smoothly.

Overnight returns on the day of DFAST results are similarly abnormal. The middle panel of Figure 3 shows data analogous to those in Figure 1 but the returns pertain to DFAST releases and are shown as a bar chart. The top and bottom panels of that figure allow a comparison with

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<sup>6</sup>Among other factors, we also control for changes in starting capital. Recent papers have focused on the predictability of stress test results. Glasserman and Tangirala (2016), for example, make note of the high correlation across the scenario results across years and across banks.

<sup>7</sup>We exclude foreign intermediate holding companies that are also subject to the stress tests.

overnight returns for the day before the release of the stress test results and for the day after. This comparison highlights that overnight returns straddling the release of stress test results are indeed special: Abnormal returns, those in the upper percentiles of the distribution for the six months prior to each release, are much more prevalent.<sup>8</sup>

## 3.2 Other Data

For the event studies, apart from data on stock returns, we also use data on CDS spreads relative to Treasuries. The data are from Markit. We select the most liquid contracts quoted in dollars with a maturity of 5 years. We focus on contracts for the senior debt tranche since these contracts are more widely traded than contracts on other tranches. CDS contracts are traded over the counter. The Markit data report quotes for 9:00 PM, the close of the trading day. While the CDS spread movements on the day surrounding stress test announcements do not tend to be as extreme (relative to their distribution) as the reaction of stock returns and traded volumes, they can still be sizable. Furthermore, there is significant heterogeneity in the results across banks.<sup>9</sup>

Moving to additional controls, in some of our regressions we use: the starting level of the tier 1 capital ratio, as reported in the CCAR/DFAST results; the difference between the starting level of the tier 1 capital ratio across cycles, when we compare two different stress test cycles; the forced decrease in payouts — the difference between the tier 1 capital minimum in the final capital plan submission and the original submission; and an indicator for whether the capital plans were objected to or not approved.<sup>10</sup> The consequences of an objection were the inability of making any capital distributions, unless expressly permitted by the Federal Reserve.<sup>11</sup> Non-approvals generally carried less-dire consequences, with firms having to limit their capital distributions to the levels of prior years.

## 4 Event Study

The stress tests had a constant format from 2013 through 2019, yielding seven events for our study. However, the day following the 2016 DFAST announcement coincided with the release of

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<sup>8</sup>An online appendix shows an analogous pattern of overnight returns for CCAR result releases.

<sup>9</sup>The online appendix includes a figure for CDS spreads analogous to Figure 1 and another analogous to Figure 3.

<sup>10</sup>Before the public disclosure of the CCAR results, each participating BHC was shown its own results and given an opportunity to reduce dividends and stock repurchases. In practice only those firms whose original capital distributions would have pushed them below statutory minima took advantage of this opportunity, which is why we are calling this revision a forced reduction in payouts.

<sup>11</sup>A firm whose capital plan was objected to could resubmit a new capital plan ahead of the following year's stress tests, but was not required to do so.

the results for the Brexit referendum, which dramatically affected the prices of bank stocks as well as other asset prices. Accordingly, we exclude the 2016 results when analysing the reaction to the DFAST releases. To compensate for the relatively short temporal dimension of the data, we exploit a larger cross-section. There are as many as 25 BHCs headquartered in the United States that have participated in the stress tests over the 2013-2019 period. Accordingly, we rely on panel regressions for our analysis.

We use the following panel regression model:

$$y_{i,t+v} = \alpha + \beta s_{i,t} + \Phi_t + \Omega_{i,t} + \Psi_i + u_{i,t+v} \quad (1)$$

where  $t$  is the day of the CCAR or DFAST announcement and where the left-hand-side term,  $y_{i,t+v}$ , is in turn:

- the overnight percentage change in the stock price of BHC  $i$  through  $t+1$  (which implies  $v = 1$ ). In other words, this is the opening price on the day  $t+1$ , following the announcement, minus the closing price on the day  $t$  of the announcement, divided by the closing price of day  $t$ , times 100.
- the daily change of the CDS spread for BHC  $i$  for day  $t$  (which implies  $v = 0$ ). In other words, this is the CDS spread surveyed at the end of day  $t$  minus the CDS spread surveyed at the end of day  $t-1$ .

Given that the stress test results are usually released at 4:30 p.m., after the closing of the trading day on the New York Stock Exchange (at 4:00 p.m.), the overnight stock price changes identify the impact of the new information in the announcements. In contrast with the stock prices, the CDS spreads are not available at a frequency higher than daily. However, given that CDS contracts are traded over the counter and that trading stops at 9:00 p.m., we can rely on market surveys for the end of the day when the stress test results were released. We difference the closing CDS spreads relative to the previous day's values to gauge the market reaction to the stress test results.

The terms on the right-hand side of Equation 1 differ depending on whether we are analyzing CCAR or DFAST results. Starting with the regression equation for CCAR, the term  $s_{i,t}$  is the difference between the minimum value for the tier 1 capital ratio attained under the current year's DFAST minus the one attained under the current year's CCAR. The term  $\Omega_{i,t}$  includes a dummy that captures supervisory actions of the Federal Reserve in the context of CCAR, non-approvals or objections; the starting capital; and forced decreases in payouts. The terms  $\Phi_t$  and  $\Psi_i$  include time fixed effects and firm-specific fixed effects, respectively.

Turning to regression equation for DFAST, the term  $s_{i,t}$  is defined as the difference between the minimum value for the tier 1 capital ratio in the current year's DFAST and the minimum value



for the same ratio in the previous year’s CCAR. The term  $\Omega_{i,t}$  includes three types of firm-specific controls: 1) the difference in the starting tier 1 capital ratio between DFAST and the previous year’s CCAR; 2) the starting capital; and 3) a dummy that captures decisions of the Federal Reserve for the previous CCAR cycle, non-approvals or objections. The terms  $\Phi_t$  and  $\Psi_i$  include time fixed effects and firm-specific fixed effects, respectively.

## 5 Capital Distributions vs. Resilience

The following two sections describe the regression results starting with DFAST and moving on to CCAR.

### 5.1 DFAST Results Offer Information on Resilience

Table 1 shows the results of panel regression models where the dependent variables are the percentage changes in stock prices and the changes in CDS spreads around DFAST announcements, expressed as basis points.

At a broad brush, when the DFAST minimum tier 1 capital ratio is higher than the previous year’s CCAR minimum, stock prices systematically increase, as we can see from the estimated coefficients in columns (1) and (2). According to those coefficients, when a bank’s minimum of the tier 1 capital ratio is one percentage point higher, the overnight stock return increases about 0.22 percentage point, all else equal.<sup>12</sup> This increase may happen for two non-mutually exclusive reasons: 1) market participants interpret increases in tier 1 capital ratio minima as a signal of greater resilience to adverse conditions, reducing the risk of holding the stocks of those banks; 2) market participants interpret the increase in tier 1 capital minima as a signal that BHCs may have more capital to distribute compared to the previous year, although there is no guarantee that the Federal Reserve will approve greater payouts until the following week’s CCAR results are released. The reaction of CDS spreads can help corroborate or exclude the first reason. Columns (3) and (4), point to a systematic decrease of CDS spreads when the DFAST minimum tier 1 capital ratio is higher than the previous year’s CCAR minimum. This decrease is even more significant, in statistical terms, than the increase in stock prices. This result points to financial market participants reading a higher stressed capital ratio as an indication of greater resilience of banks in the face of harsh economic conditions. A corollary of this finding is that financial market participants view the stress test scenario as relevant and the results as credible.

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<sup>12</sup>This increase is statistically significant at conventional levels based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. This increase remains significant when considering standard errors that are clustered at the firm level, as documented in the online appendix.

## 5.2 CCAR Results Point to Changes in Capital Distributions

Table 2 shows the results of panel regression models where the dependent variables are the overnight stock price returns and CDS spread changes around CCAR announcements.

In this case, and in contrast with our results for DFAST releases, the difference between the minimum value of the tier 1 capital ratio under DFAST and under CCAR has an insignificant coefficient for both stock returns and CDS spreads. However, from column (2) we can see that the Federal Reserve issued a non-approval or an outright objection to the proposed capital plans, stock returns systematically decreased. This decrease is sizable for overnight returns. On average, it is sized at about 2.2 percentage points, all else equal. However, the insignificance of the coefficient on the same dummy in the regression of CDS spreads in column (4) indicates that the main concern of market participants at this phase of the stress tests is the impact of supervisory actions on capital distributions. After all the previously released DFAST results already provided information on bank resilience in the face of adverse conditions that, as we showed, is systematically related to CDS spreads.

## 6 Sensitivity Analysis

An online appendix documents robustness of our regression results to numerous specification changes. We refer the interested reader to that appendix for those additional results and only sketch here the most salient changes we considered. We focus on two types of sensitivity analysis. The first type considers alternative specifications keeping the change in tier 1 minimum capital across stress test cycles as the surprise measure for the event studies. The second type of sensitivity analysis considers alternative surprise measures. In sum, the baseline results are strikingly robust.

### 6.1 Robustness to Specification Changes

Under CCAR, firms had a chance to reduce their proposed capital distributions to avoid a stressed capital minimum that fell short of the statutory ratios. The change in tier 1 capital minimum from DFAST to CCAR in our baseline specification is based on the CCAR minimum under the original plans. However, the regression includes a term for the (forced) decrease in payouts when firms resubmitted capital plans with lower distributions when the original plans put them below a statutory ratio.<sup>13</sup> This term is flagged in the results released by the Federal Reserve. As an alternative, we can compute the change in tier 1 capital minimum across DFAST and CCAR

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<sup>13</sup>The banks participating in the U.S. stress tests were given a limited set of options for revising their capital plan submissions. See the section entitled “Limited Adjustments to Planned Capital Actions” in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2019).

with the CCAR minimum based on the revised plans and exclude the term that captures the forced reduction in capital distributions. When we make these changes the regression results vary little quantitatively and are unchanged qualitatively.

The samples for the CCAR regressions and the DFAST regressions have different number of observations, complicating the comparison of results. The CCAR regressions have more observations because we do not need to compute the change in tier 1 minimum capital across stress test cycles. Moreover, we do not need to drop 2016 for the CCAR regressions—remember that the release of the DFAST results coincided with the announcement of the results for the Brexit referendum. When we drop the additional observations from the sample for the CCAR regressions, the coefficient on the objection dummy is even more statistically significant. There are no other changes of note in the regression results.

## 6.2 Robustness to Alternative Surprise Measures

The measure summarizing the information provided by the release of stress test results in our baseline regressions is based on tier 1 capital. However, the stress test results report the starting value and minimum conditional on the stress test scenarios for other statutory ratios: the tier 1 leverage ratio, the total risk-based capital ratio, and the common equity tier 1 ratio. We also consider surprise measures based on each of these alternative ratios and find that our results are extremely robust.

## 7 Conclusion

We find evidence that market participants extract different information from the two components of the U.S. stress test. The earlier DFAST results point to market participants taking signal for the resilience of banks from changes in capital positions under stressed conditions. Banks with a higher stressed capital minimum relative to the previous stress test cycle systematically experience an increase in their stock prices and a decrease in their CDS spreads. Our analysis of the market reaction to the release of the CCAR results points to a systematic reaction to restrictions on payouts limited to stock returns.

These results back the widespread use of stress tests to inform market participants on the soundness of banks. Our analysis confirms that market participants value the stress test announcements not only to gauge future capital distributions, which would simply benefit a limited set of investors, but also as indicators of bank resilience, with importance for the broader public. In the United States, stress tests have supervisory consequences for bank capital, but our results point to the usefulness of the information provided by stress tests even when the results are not tied to capital

actions by the regulator, as is the case in other countries.

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Table 1: Market Reaction to DFAST Announcements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Stock returns	Stock returns	$\Delta$ CDS spreads	$\Delta$ CDS spreads
DFAST-CCAR min.	0.216* (0.017)	0.217* (0.017)	-0.383** (0.005)	-0.407** (0.004)
DFAST-CCAR(-1) start	0.0710 (0.393)	0.0776 (0.334)	-0.212 (0.174)	-0.162 (0.310)
Starting capital	-0.236* (0.015)	-0.236* (0.015)	0.340+ (0.059)	0.342+ (0.060)
Objection or non-approval, lagged		-0.0660 (0.749)		-0.446 (0.434)
r2	0.634	0.634	0.422	0.424
N	102	102	93	93

*p*-values in parentheses

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$

*Note:* The dependent variables in the panel regressions in columns (1) and (2) are overnight returns surrounding DFAST announcements; columns (3) and (4) are for changes in CDS spreads at the end of the day of the DFAST announcements relative to the end of the day prior. *DFAST-CCAR min.* is the difference between the current year DFAST and the previous year CCAR minimum value of the tier 1 capital ratio over the nine-quarter assessment period used in the U.S. stress tests. *DFAST-CCAR(-1) start* is the difference between the starting level of the tier 1 capital ratio across cycles. *Starting capital* is the starting level of the tier 1 capital ratio. *Objections or non-approvals, lagged* is a dummy that assumes value one if the capital plans were objected to or not approved in the previous year CCAR. All the regressions include banks and year fixed effects. In parentheses we report the *p*-values where + $p < 0.1$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ . These values are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Table 2: Market Reaction to CCAR Announcements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Stock returns	Stock returns	$\Delta$ CDS spreads	$\Delta$ CDS spreads
DFAST-CCAR min.	0.0629 (0.620)	0.0401 (0.724)	-0.266 (0.463)	-0.269 (0.459)
Forced decrease in payouts	0.311 (0.438)	0.324 (0.347)	-0.301 (0.570)	-0.368 (0.486)
Starting capital	0.305* (0.015)	0.170+ (0.083)	0.114 (0.718)	0.144 (0.659)
Objections or non-approvals		-2.145** (0.000)		0.532 (0.450)
r2	0.590	0.717	0.524	0.527
N	150	150	111	111

*Note:* The dependent variables in the panel regressions in columns (1) and (2) are overnight stock returns surrounding CCAR announcements; columns (3) and (4) are for changes in CDS spreads at the end of the day of the CCAR announcements relative to end of the day prior. *DFAST-CCAR min.* is the difference between the current year DFAST and CCAR minimum value of the tier 1 capital ratio over the nine-quarter assessment period used in the U.S. stress tests. *Forced decrease in payouts* is the difference between the tier 1 capital minimum in the final capital plan submission and the original submission. *Starting capital* is the starting level of the tier 1 capital ratio. *Objections or non-approvals* is a dummy that assumes value one if the capital plans were objected to or not approved. All the regressions include banks and year fixed effects. In parentheses, we report the  $p$ -values where  $+p < 0.1$ ,  $*p < 0.05$ ,  $**p < 0.01$ . These values are based on standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Figure 1: Overnight Returns Following CCAR Announcements (absolute values, shown as percentiles of the distribution for the preceding six months)

Bank	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Ally Financial Inc.			100	100	99	100	
American Express Company	74	53	87	74	92	93	
BB&T Corporation	1	23	93	91	98	92	
Bank of America Corporation	98	77	26	91	98	93	98
Capital One Financial Corporation	67	85	89	85	7	86	88
Citigroup Inc.	54	1	97	89	98	92	92
Comerica Incorporated		31	93	90	99		
Discover Financial Services		28	97	80	96	92	
Fifth Third Bancorp	40	17	90	89	98	92	
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated		68	89	81	98	84	
JPMorgan Chase & Co.	4	54	81	81	98	95	96
KeyCorp	40	78	94	96	97	95	
M&T Bank Corporation		32	84	97	93	94	
Morgan Stanley	55	34	99	69	97	91	93
Northern Trust Corporation		47	93	10	97	87	94
RBS Citizens Financial Group, Inc.			49	94	99	87	
Regions Financial Corporation	65	19	99	87	99	95	
State Street Corporation	44	38	92	86	97	22	89
SunTrust Banks, Inc.	11	63	91	89	99	98	
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation	24	59	98	91	96	90	94
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.	4	54	89	86	98	74	97
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.	23	52	95	90	99	84	93
U.S. Bancorp	15	34	89	87	97	93	88
Wells Fargo & Company	91	98	95	81	98	99	92
Zions Bancorporation		84	94	93	99		

*Note:* Absolute values of the overnight returns following the release of the CCAR results expressed as percentile of the distribution of overnight stock returns for each bank for the six months preceding the release of the results. The percentiles reported are based on calculations by the authors on data from CRSP.




Figure 2: Trading Volumes Following CCAR Announcements (shown as percentiles of the distribution for the preceding six months)

Bank	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Ally Financial Inc.			88	99	65	80	
American Express Company	88	34	86	83	58	53	
BB&T Corporation	97	91	77	86	82	74	
Bank of America Corporation	96	88	80	80	84	73	73
Capital One Financial Corporation	92	70	76	86	85	45	59
Citigroup Inc.	81	87	81	76	79	67	60
Comerica Incorporated		79	72	87	73		
Discover Financial Services		28	73	54	73	36	
Fifth Third Bancorp	92	88	91	90	80	74	
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated		75	63	96	87	91	
JPMorgan Chase & Co.	96	77	67	72	80	68	73
KeyCorp	94	81	89	96	80	81	
M&T Bank Corporation		83	79	90	90	92	
Morgan Stanley	91	72	83	85	78	72	78
Northern Trust Corporation		60	47	90	67	41	94
RBS Citizens Financial Group, Inc.			11	97	73	85	
Regions Financial Corporation	93	81	95	92	95	81	
State Street Corporation	94	85	79	94	46	57	97
SunTrust Banks, Inc.	91	64	64	74	80	79	
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation	92	83	79	80	61	82	82
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.	82	54	39	64	69	45	67
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.	80	65	85	83	70	82	77
U.S. Bancorp	90	77	72	71	77	74	77
Wells Fargo & Company	94	80	77	72	84	91	82
Zions Bancorporation		95	90	96	89		

*Note:* Trading volume for the day after the release of the CCAR results expressed as percentiles of the distribution of daily trading volumes for each bank for the six months preceding the release of the results. The percentiles reported are based on calculations by the authors on data from CRSP.

Figure 3: Abnormal Overnight Stock Returns for Stress-Tested Banks Are Prevalent When Results Are Announced: Reactions to DFAST Results Across Cycles



*Note:* The absolute value of the overnight returns shown are expressed as percentiles of their realized distribution for the six months prior to the release of the stress test results. The middle panel shows the absolute value of overnight returns based on stock prices at the market closing and opening straddling the announcement of DFAST results. For comparison, the top and bottom panel show analogous returns for the day before and for the day after the announcement of DFAST results, respectively. The percentiles shown are based on calculations by the authors on stock price data from CRSP.